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Abstract
Regional labor markets are characterized by huge disparities. The literature on the wage
curve argues that there exists a negative relationship between unemployment and wages.
However, this literature cannot explain how disparities of these variables between regions
endogenously arise. In contrast, the New Economic Geography analyzes how disparities of
regional goods markets endogenously arise, but usually ignores unemployment. Therefore,
this paper discusses regional unemployment disparities by introducing eﬃciency wages into
the New Economic Geography. This model shows how disparities of regional goods and labor
markets endogenously arise through the interplay of increasing returns to scale, transport
costs and migration.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J64, R12, R23
Keywords: regional unemployment, new economic geography, core-periphery, wage curve,
labor migration
11 Introduction
Regional labor markets are characterized by huge disparities with regard to employment devel-
opment, unemployment and wages. The scale of such disparities between regions is comparable
to that between national states. While institutional diﬀerences are often held responsible for dis-
parities between national labor markets (Blanchard and Wolfers; 2000), they can only account
for a minor fraction of disparities between regional labor markets. This goes back to the fact
that labor market institutions vary only marginally between regions of a national state (Blien
and Sanner; 2006).
In the literature, diﬀerent approaches for modeling regional labor markets exist. Blanchard
and Katz present the perhaps most comprehensive model for explaining disparities between
regional labor markets (Elhorst; 2003). Blanchard and Katz (1992) regionalize a wage-/price-
setting model. They discuss how regional labor markets adjust to shocks in labor demand via
reactions of employment, participation, unemployment and migration. The model is based on
the wage curve approach of Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990). Since labor market institutions
vary only marginally on the regional level, the wage curve has to be similar for all regions as
well. Under this assumption disparities of regional labor markets are predominantly the result of
diﬀerences in labor demand between the regions. Regional labor demand in turn is derived from
regional production. However, Blanchard and Katz (1992) do not endogenously explain why
labor demand and production diﬀer between regions. Instead, the authors discuss the impacts
of shocks in labor demand on regional labor markets. They do not discuss how disparities
endogenously arise.
Overman and Puga (2002) empirically show that disparities of regional unemployment rates
in Europe are ascribed to labor demand. If diﬀering labor demand is the reason for regional
labor market disparities, then diﬀerences between regional goods markets play a key role for
these disparities. The New Economic Geography analyzes how disparities of regional goods mar-
kets endogenously arise. Models of the New Economic Geography are traced back to the basic
core-periphery model by Krugman (1991). Krugman (1991) models centrifugal and centripetal
forces and discusses how regional disparities of goods markets endogenously arise through their
interaction. However, such models usually assume cleared labor markets and ignore unemploy-
ment.
Many empirical studies supply evidence in favor of the existence of a wage curve in western
economies (Blanchﬂower and Oswald; 1990). The concept of the wage curve is a prevalent concept
in economic theory and is frequently applied for modeling frictions in (regional) labor markets.
It therefore stands to reason combining New Economic Geography models with theories of
2unemployment to explain disparities of regional labor markets. Only individual approaches mod-
eling frictions of regional labor markets within the framework of the New Economic Geography
exist, such as the model of Epifani and Gancia (2005). Nevertheless, these authors concentrate
on frictions in job matching, whereas wages are assumed to be ﬂexible.
In this paper disparities of regional labor markets are discussed in the framework of the
New Economic Geography. The core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) forms the basis for the
modeling of disparities of regional goods markets, and its labor market is adjusted. Therefore the
model consists of two regions and two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. The manufacturing
sector is characterized by increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition whereas the
agricultural sector is a competitive market with constant returns to scale. Both, agricultural
and manufacturing goods are traded freely between the regions. However, iceberg transport
costs exist for manufacturing goods. While in the Krugman model employment in a region is
determined by the labor force (due to full employment), in the present model unemployment is
allowed to be larger than zero. Employment is therefore not only endogenous in the long run
due to migration (as in the Krugman model), but as well in the short run due to unemployment.
Unemployment is modeled by eﬃciency wages, based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Eﬃciency
wage models are especially useful for modeling the wage curve on the regional level.1 Blien
(2001) for example argues that they are in particular suitable to model a wage curve for German
regions.
The eﬃciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is based on the utilities of un-
employed, shirking and non-shirking employed. Employers only imperfectly observe shirking.
Therefore there is an incentive to shirk in the case of competitive wages. In order to prevent
shirking, employers pay eﬃciency wages. Since eﬃciency wages are higher than competitive
wages, unemployment arises as a result. However, this eﬃciency wage model is modiﬁed to
account for the fact that the unemployed can migrate between the regions: Unemployed com-
pare their lifetime utilities between both regions and decide to migrate if their utility in the
neighboring region is higher than in their home region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In chapter 2 an overview of the related literature
is delivered. The basic model is presented in chapter 3. Subsequently the equilibrium is discussed
with a special focus on migration. Chapter 5 is about on the stability of the equilibria. Results
are interpreted and discussed in chapter 6 and conclusions are drawn in the ﬁnal chapter.
1Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) deliver a summary of the empirical relevance of the wage curve approach.
32 Related Literature
Diﬀerent approaches exist that integrate the labor market into the New Economic Geography.
Several models discuss labor market rigidities within the New Economic Geography or related
models for the comparison of national states. However, due to their focus on the international
level these models assume immobile labor. For example, Méjean and Patureau (2010) discuss
the inﬂuence of minimum wages on location decisions of ﬁrms. Strauss-Kahn (2005) studies
— in the framework of the New Economic Geography — how ﬁxed wages and heterogeneous
labor leads to vertical specialization an further increases disparities of high and low skilled labor.
Picard and Toulemonde (2006) present a core-periphery model with labor unions bargaining over
wages. Higher wages can increase purchasing power in a country under certain circumstances and
an eﬀect on the domestic market might result, stimulating agglomeration. However, the authors
ignore unemployment. Monford and Ottaviano (2002) discuss a New Economic Geography model
in which agglomerative forces result from the labor market. Chen and Zhao (2009) chose a 2-
country 2-sector approach with inter-sectorally mobile but internationally immobile labor. They
analyze the impact of wage subsidies in the industry sector when wages in the neighboring
country are ﬂexible. However, all of these models assume immobile labor between the regions
and therefore concentrate on the international level.
Peeters and Garretsen (2000) model heterogeneous labor and rigid wages within the New
Economic Geography. They analyze the impact of globalization (in form of decreasing transport
costs) on high and low qualiﬁed labor. High qualiﬁed labor is mobile. Nevertheless the authors
assume full employment in one of the two countries. Therefore their model is unable to ex-
plain why unemployment rates develop diﬀerently in both countries. Furthermore, they discuss
institutional diﬀerences between the labor markets. Therefore, their approach is adequate for
discussing disparities between national states, but it is less suitable for analyzing disparities of re-
gional labor markets within a national state since labor market institutions vary only marginally
on the regional level.2
This paper instead focuses on the regional level, where labor migration is a key factor. Epifani
and Gancia (2005) apply a similar approach: They model regional labor markets and interregional
labor migration within the framework of the New Economic Geography. Rigidities exist in
regional labor markets based on job matching, leading to equilibrium unemployment. Through
2Three further models should be mentioned here: Haaland and Wooton (2007) model the location decision of
multinational companies when there is wage bargaining with labor unions. Pﬂüger (2004) discusses the location
decision when there is monopolistic competition and when diﬀerences exist in the social insurance and tax systems.
Dewit et al. (2003) analyze the location decision of oligopolistic companies when dismissal costs diﬀer between
countries (by use of game theory).
4the goods market, based on the New Economic Geography, agglomeration might result (for
medium and low transport costs). If agglomeration occurs, this aﬀects regional labor markets
leading to lower unemployment in the agglomeration compared to the periphery. In the short
term migration decreases unemployment disparities, since unemployed leave the lagging region.
However, in the long term migration intensiﬁes unemployment disparities through enforcing
agglomeration.3
Epifani and Gancia (2005) assume ﬂexible wages and concentrate on labor market rigidities
in the form of job matching. They argue that future research needs to discuss the integration of
wage setting frictions into the framework of the New Economic Geography.
Südekum (2005) models a wage curve based on eﬃciency wages within the framework of
a goods market which is characterized by monopolistic competition and increasing returns to
scale. However, the author concentrates exclusively on agglomerative forces and prevents full
agglomeration only by assuming a home bias for migration. He views his model as a ﬁrst step
to include unemployment into the New Economic Geography but does not refer to his model
as a New Economic Geography model due to the omission of centrifugal forces. The model of
Südekum (2005) is based on an earlier model of Matusz (1996).4
Thus, Südekum (2005) already took the ﬁrst step of introducing eﬃciency wages into a model
of monopolistic competition. However, Suedekum only includes centripetal but no centrifugal
forces. Against this background the present paper introduces eﬃciency wages into a full New
Economic Geography model and discusses the impacts of agglomeration on regional labor mar-
kets.
Egger and Seidel (2008) deliver a comparable approach. They integrate a “fair wage” approach
into the New Economic Geography. The work eﬀort of low qualiﬁed is inﬂuenced by the fairness
of their wages. This leads to a link between wages and unemployment. However, only low
qualiﬁed may become unemployed. Furthermore, low qualiﬁed are (in contrast to high qualiﬁed)
inter-regionally immobile. In addition, the wage of low qualiﬁed is ﬁxed to one in both regions.
Thus a wage curve exists only in the sense that the unemployment of low qualiﬁed is linked to
the wage of high qualiﬁed. The model presented here instead shows a link between wage and
unemployment of the same labor market group and unemployed are allowed to migrate between
the regions.
3Francis (2009) extends the Epifani and Gancia (2005) model so as to endogenise the job destruction rate.
4Matusz (1996) discusses a wage curve based on eﬃciency wages within the framework of the New Trade
Theory. He focuses on international level and ignores migration for this reason.
53 Basic Model
The present paper develops a New Economic Geography model with labor market rigidities based
on eﬃciency wages (and thus a wage curve). The model is constructed to discuss how disparities
of regional labor markets endogenously arise. The New Economic Geography part of this model
is depicted from Fujita et al. (1999). Their household model is extended to disutility of work
eﬀort which is basic for modeling eﬃciency wages. Eﬃciency wages are based on the approach of
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The goods market in turn is based on Fujita et al. (1999). However,
the assumption of full employment is dropped and unemployment results as a consequence of
eﬃciency wages.
There exist two regions, r and s, as well as two sectors, agriculture A and manufacturing M.
Agriculture is characterized by perfect competition on both, goods and labor market. Manufac-
turing instead is characterized by monopolistic competition on the goods market and eﬃciency
wages on the labor market. Labor is inter-sectoral immobile but labor in manufacturing is
interregional mobile. Labor in agriculture is interregional immobile.
3.1 Households
Households receive utility by the consumption of agricultural goods CA and by the consumption
of manufacturing goods. CM represents a composite index of manufacturing goods. Utility is





A − e (1)











The number of ﬁrms is given by m and the elasticity of substitution between the varieties
of the manufacturing goods is θ > 1. Households maximize their utility in two stages. They
decide upon the optimum division of their income on agricultural and manufacturing goods. In
addition they decide upon the optimum composition of the varieties of the manufacturing good.
The budget constraint of household j is:
GCMj + PACAj = Ij (3)
5This utility function can be extended to cover congestion costs by multiplying it with a congestion costs factor
H similar to Ricci (1999). Then the agglomeration pattern changes, as we show in another paper (Zierahn; 2011).
6Household j uses all of his income Ij for consumption of agricultural goods CA at price PA ≡ 1
and for consumption of the composite index of manufacturing goods CM at price index G. Due to
the standardization PA ≡ 1, the prices of the manufacturing goods (and all wages) are measured
relative to agricultural prices. Inserting the budget constraint into the utility function delivers:
Uj = C
µ
Mj (Ij − GCMj)
1−µ − e (4)
Utility maximization (∂Uj/∂CMj = 0) leads to the consumption expenditure shares of agri-
cultural and manufacturing goods in income. Note that the result of the utility maximization is





CAj =(1 − µ)Ij (6)
The optimum division of expenditures for manufacturing goods on the individual varieties
results from utility maximization over the varieties. This is equal to minimizing the expenditures
























In the two-region-case with identical ﬁrms and iceberg transport costs τ ≥ 1 this leads to the









whereas mr and ms represent the number of ﬁrms (=varieties) in the corresponding region.














CA consumption of agricultural goods
CM composite index of manufacturing goods
Ci consumption of manufacturing good i
e disutility of work eﬀort
G CES manufacturing price index
I income
LA,M agricultural/manufacturing employees
M diﬀerence in expected life-time utilities
m number of manufacturing ﬁrms (varieties)
NA,M agricultural/manufacturing labor force
PA price of agricultural goods
Pi price of manufacturing good i
Pt(i,j) transition probability from status i to status j at time t
qi manufacturing output of ﬁrm i
()r,s regions r and s
s additional labor input due to shirking
Uj utility of household j
Uns, Us, Uu utility of (non-)shirking employees / unemployed
Ur,s unemployment rate in region r (s)
v(w) utility resulting from the wage
V ns, V s, V u expected life-time utility of (non-)shirking employees / unemployed
w wage rate
β ﬁx labor input
1 − γ detection probability of shirking
δ endogenous job creation rate
θ elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties
λ share of manufacturing employees in region r
µ expenditure share of manufacturing goods
π yield/proﬁt
ρ discount rate of utility
τ transport costs
φ variable labor input
ψ exogenous job destruction rate
Table 1: List of Variables and Parameters
83.2 Labor Market
The labor market is modeled within the eﬃciency wage framework of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Here the derivation of their wage curve is based on Zenou and Smith (1995).6 Only the derivation
of the wage curve for region r is presented. The wage curve for region s follows analogously.
Employees (which are equal to households) receive utility v(wr) through the wage wr in region
r, which is equal to the household income Ij. The income of unemployed households is zero.






Thus, the term v(wr) is only a means to abbreviate the derivation of the wage curve. Due
to disutility of work eﬀort, employees have an incentive to shirk and hence to avoid work eﬀort.
The utility of a non-shirking employee in region r is Uns
r = v(w) − e, the utility of a shirking
employee is Us
r = v(w) and unemployed do not receive any utility Uu
r = 0. The employment
status of the households are subject to a time-homogenous Markov process with status 0 for
unemployed and status 1 for employed. The transition probabilities Pt(i,j) at time t depend on
the current status, the endogenous job generation rate δr, the exogenous job destruction rate ψ
and the detection probability of shirking 1−γ.7 The transition probabilities of non-shirking and


























ψ + δr + 1 − γ
−
δr + 1 − γ







ψ + δr + 1 − γ
−
ψ + 1 − γ
ψ + δr + 1 − γ
e
−t(δr+ψ+1−γ) (15)
The parameter ρ is the discount rate of utility. The lifetime utilities of shirking and non-
shirking employees are then derived similar to Zenou and Smith (1995):
6Zenou and Smith (1995) construct a two-city-model with intra- and inter-city migration. They derive the
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) eﬃciency wage model by using Markov processes to model the transitions from and to
unemployment. For the purpose of the present model the inter-city migration is adopted to the two-region case.




















ρ(δr + ψ + ρ)
=
(δr + ρ)(v(wr) − e)



















r + (ψ + 1 − γ)Uu
r
ρ(δr + ψ + ρ + 1 − γ)
=
(δr + ρ)(v(wr))
ρ(δr + ψ + ρ + 1 − γ)
(17)
The labor market equilibrium is given by two conditions. First, employers pay eﬃciency wages
to prevent shirking at the margin. Therefore the wages are set at the level required to equalize
utilities of shirking and non-shirking employees (V ns
r = V s
r ):
v(wr) = e
ρ + ψ + δr + 1 − γ
1 − γ
(18)
Second, in equilibrium the inﬂow to unemployment ψLMr is equal to the outﬂow of unem-
ployment δ(NMr − LMr) (where LMr is the number of manufacturing employees and NMr is the
manufacturing labor force in region r). Therefore the endogenous rate of job creation is given
by:
δr = ψLMr/(NMr − LMr) (19)
Taking into account the deﬁnition for v(wr) and the deﬁnition of the unemployment rate
Ur = LMr/(NMr − LMr) delivers the wage curve for region r (the wage curve for region s is




















Equation (20) directly links the wage to the unemployment rate and represents the wage curve
resulting from eﬃciency wages. It represents the wage ﬁrms pay in order to prevent shirking at
the margin.
Now, migration takes place. Individuals who migrate are unemployed in the immigration-
region at ﬁrst, due to search unemployment. An individual decides to migrate when her expected
10life-time utility as an unemployed is larger abroad than in the current status at home. However,
to monitor whether migration takes place it is suﬃcient to compare expected life-time utilities
of unemployed in both regions. The reason is that the expected life-time utility of employees
is always larger than that of unemployed: V ns
r > V u
r . Therefore, migration takes place when
V u
r < V u
s . This is true as long as we are interested in whether someone migrates instead of who
(employees or unemployed) migrates. For observing migration we therefore compare expected
life-time utilities of unemployed in both regions. The expected life-time utility of an unemployed


















r + (ψ + ρ)Uu
r
ρ(δr + ψ + ρ)
=
δr(v(wr) − e)
ρ(δr + ψ + ρ)
(21)















Emigration (immigration) takes place when the expected life-time utility of unemployed in
the neighboring region is larger (lower) than the expected life-time utility of unemployed in the
home region.
3.3 Goods Market
The goods market is based on the core-periphery model of Fujita et al. (1999) and is separated
into agriculture and manufacturing. The agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good under
perfect competition, and trade between regions is free and costless, i.e. a single price results. The
labor market of the agricultural sector is characterized by perfect competition as well, leading to
full employment. Labor input LA and output in agriculture CA are linked through the production
function CA = LA. Due to marginal productivity payment in the agricultural labor market, the
price of agricultural goods is equal to 1: PA = ∂CA/∂LA = wA = 1. Prices and wages in
agriculture are ﬁxed to 1 and serve as reference for prices and wages in manufacturing.
Firms in manufacturing instead produce under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
8See Zenou and Smith (1995).
11competition. There is trade of manufacturing goods at iceberg transport costs τ. The production
function in manufacturing is:
LMi = β + φqi + si (23)
For production ﬁrm i needs a ﬁxed labor input β, a variable labor input φ per unit of output
qi and an additional labor input si due to shirking employees. Labor demand LMi of ﬁrm i is
the sum of these three components. Due to eﬃciency wages there is no shirking and hence no
additional labor input is needed: si = 0. Due to love for variety no combination of ﬁrms exists
producing the same variety. The yield of ﬁrm i is given by:
πi = Piqi − wr(β + φqi) (24)
Firms maximize their proﬁt through prices and ignore their inﬂuence on the price index G.
This leads to the price setting rule for the regional price Pr which is identical for all ﬁrms of a
region (due to identical wages within a region and due to identical ﬁrms):
∂πi
∂Pi




























Production and employment per ﬁrm in equilibrium are constant and equal for all ﬁrms
irrespective of their region. This leads to the number of ﬁrms in a region:
mr = LMr/LMi = LMr/(βθ) (29)
The labor input per unit of output is standardized to φ ≡ (θ − 1)/θ, so that price and
production reduce to:
12Pr = wr (30)
qi = θβ = LMi (31)
The ﬁx labor input is standardized to β ≡ µ/θ. Then the number of ﬁrms (=varieties) in a
region as well as the production of a ﬁrm are given by:
mr = LMr/µ (32)
qi = LMi = µ (33)
In equilibrium the production of a ﬁrm is equal to the sum of regional demand for the variety of
the ﬁrm and import demand of the neighboring region for the ﬁrms variety (taking into account



















The latter equation represents the goods market equilibrium in form of a price setting function.
It represents the wage at which the condition of zero proﬁts is fulﬁlled and no ﬁrms enter or leave
the market. For lower wages, the proﬁt of an additional ﬁrm is greater than zero so that new
ﬁrms enter the market. This results in increasing employment, decreasing unemployment and in-
creasing shirking. To prevent shirking, ﬁrms increase wages (wage curve). This process continues
until the wage fulﬁlling the zero-proﬁt condition is equal to the wage preventing shirking.
4 Equilibrium and Migration
The simultaneous equilibrium in both regions is deﬁned by the price indexes, price setting func-
tions, incomes and wage curves of both regions (only equations for region r are presented, equa-
tions for region s are constructed analogous):
9If one unit of the manufacturing good is transfered to the neighboring region, only 1/τ units arrive. Therefore







































From (36), it follows that the region with the larger number of manufacturing employees has
a lower price index. This is because a larger number of manufacturing employees results in a
larger number of varieties produced, increasing competition. Then the demand for any individual
variety is lower, its price and corresponding revenues decrease, leading to a lower price index.
Furthermore transport costs are lower in the agglomeration, which further reduces the price index
in the agglomeration.
The price setting equation (37)10 represents the wage (=price) at which ﬁrms reach their break-
even point (i.e. where proﬁts are zero). The higher incomes and prices and the lower transport
costs are, the higher is this wage. Regions with a higher income have a higher purchasing power
and the break-even point of ﬁrms lies at a higher wage. An increase of income in a region leads
to a lower or higher increase of employment, depending on the wage elasticity of labor supply.
When the increase in employment is larger, centripetal forces dominate: A region that once
manages to gain a higher income will be able to use this advantage for attracting new ﬁrms,
income and demand, enforcing an agglomeration process. This process endogenously leads to
agglomeration and regional disparities.
The region with the larger number of manufacturing employees thus has higher nominal wages
(backward linkage) so that this region is more attractive for ﬁrms due to its higher purchasing
power. This region is further characterized by a larger number of varieties and thus a lower price
index and is therefore more attractive for immigration (forward linkage). These forward and
backward linkages establish the centripetal forces leading to endogenous agglomeration. These
are opposed to centrifugal forces resulting from the demand by the agricultural employees.
Equation (39) represents the wage curve, which is the extension of this paper to the core-
periphery model. The wage curve is the link between employment and wages, leading to unem-
ployment. It represents the wage set by ﬁrms to prevent shirking.
For a compact illustration of the model the labor force (as a sum of agricultural and manu-
10This equation is labeled “wage equation” by Fujita et al. (1999).
14facturing labor force) is standardized to one. This labor force is separated into agriculture (NA)
and manufacturing (NM) according to the expenditure shares of agricultural and manufacturing
goods in income. The agricultural labor force is equal in both region whereas the labor force
in manufacturing is divided between the regions according to λ. Due to full employment in
agriculture the corresponding labor force is equal to employment in both regions (NAr = LAr









NMr = µλ (42)
NMs = µ(1 − λ) (43)
The simultaneous equilibrium in the short term depends on the exogenous parameters: disu-
tiliy of work eﬀort (e), probability to observe shirking (1−γ), job destruction rate (ψ), share of
expenditures for manufacturing (µ), elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods vari-
eties (θ) and discount rate (ρ). The model cannot be solved analytically but rather numerically,
which is standard practice in New Economic Geography.
In the long term unemployed are allowed to migrate between the regions. Unemployed compare
their expected utility in both regions and decide to migrate when their utility is higher in the
neighboring region. Their utility depends on their real wages11 and chances to ﬁnd employment.12
The agglomeration forces are similar to Fujita et al. (1999). Due to the wage curve, higher real
wages in a region are always accompanied by lower unemployment in that region compared to the
neighboring region. Migration behavior (expressed as the change in λ) is therefore suﬃciently
deﬁned by:13





12The chance to ﬁnd employment depends on the endogenous job creation rate and thus directly depends on
the unemployment rate.
13This deﬁnition of migration behavior is motivated by optimal migration decisions based on static expectations
on the diﬀerences in real wages, unemployment and congestion costs between both regions (Baldwin et al.; 2003,
Appendix 2.B.4). It further extends the underlying logic of the basic eﬃciency wage model to the migration-case:
In the basic model the equilibrium is reached when the expected life-time utilities of shirking and non-shirking
employees are equal. Analogously the long-term equilibrium is reached when the expected life-time utilities of
unemployed in both regions are equal.











































Figure 1: Equilibria and Migration































In case of symmetry (λ = 0.5) there is no migration since — due to symmetry — the endoge-
nous variables are equal in both regions. When there is no symmetry (λ  = 0.5), the endogenous
variables can diﬀer between both regions and migration might occur depending on these diﬀer-
ences. For any given λ, a short term equilibrium exists. However, if the utility of unemployed
diﬀers between the regions in the short term equilibrium, unemployed migrate leading to a new
short term equilibrium. A long term equilibrium results when the utility of unemployed is equal
in both regions so that no further migration occurs. For zero congestion costs, migration takes
place from the region with the higher to the region with the lower unemployment rate. The
diﬀerence in unemployment rates in the short term equilibrium, depending on λ, is displayed for
diﬀerent transport costs in Figure 1 (for the parameters e = 0.5, γ = 0.1, ψ = 0.1, µ = 0.6,
θ = 4, ρ = 0.05).
Depending on transport costs τ, diﬀerent situations result. For low transport costs the unem-
16ployment rate is always lower in the larger region (in the agglomeration). A marginal advantage
of a region (compared to the other region) then leads to a self enforcing agglomeration process
until full agglomeration is reached. The symmetric equilibrium at λ = 0.5 is instable in this
case. For high transport costs the unemployment rate is always higher in the larger region so
that the system returns to the symmetrical equilibrium at λ = 0.5 for initial λ. For medium
transport costs, two additional equilibria (i.e. equal unemployment rates in both regions) result
— in this case the symmetrical equilibrium is stable as is the equilibrium with full agglomeration.
The additional equilibria then serve as thresholds that have to be crossed for the agglomeration
process to be stable (i.e. to reach full agglomeration starting from symmetry).
5 Stability
Multiple equilibria result. The behavior of the system crucially depends on the stability of these
equilibra. An long term equilibrium is given by equal unemployment rates in both regions, which
is equal to the real wages being equal in both regions. As discussed above, the symmetrical
equilibrium is instable for small transport costs but becomes stable once a certain value for
the transport costs is crossed. This value marks the break point. For the equilibria at full
agglomeration there is a similar pattern: They are stable for low transport costs but become
instable once transport costs increase over a certain value. The value of the transport costs,
where this change takes place, is the sustain point.
5.1 Sustain Point
The sustain point lies at λ = 1 (or λ = 0), i.e. at full agglomeration. In the sustain point the
unemployment rates (or real wages) are equal in both regions. If the unemployment rate (real
wage) was higher (lower) in the agglomeration, the agglomeration would not be stable. The
sustain point therefore is given by those transport costs τ, at which the unemployment rates of
both regions are equal in the full agglomeration equilibrium. However, in the full agglomeration
equilibrium the unemployment rate of the periphery is not deﬁned. To solve the system, the
unemployment rates (or equally: the chances of ﬁnding a job) of both regions are set equal and
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Using these equations the sustain point can be calculated for all parameter constellations
together with the values of the endogenous variables.
When there is full agglomeration, increasing transport cost lead to an increase of the price
index in the periphery and the periphery becomes less attractive (the agglomeration becomes
more stable). However, at the same time increasing transport cost lead to a decrease in the level
of the wage at which ﬁrms reach their break-even point in the periphery. Thus, the periphery
becomes more attractive for ﬁrms when transport costs increase (the agglomeration pattern
becomes more instable). For low transport costs the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the agglomeration
becomes more stable. For high transport costs, the second eﬀect dominates and the agglomeration
18pattern becomes instable. The net eﬀect is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by showing the development of
the diﬀerence in unemployment rates against transport costs.
5.2 Break Point
In the break point transport costs increase to the level where the symmetrical equilibrium be-
comes stable. The symmetric equilibrium is stable, if a marginal increase of λ leads to an increase
(decrease) of the unemployment rate in region r (s) (equally: to a decrease/increase of the chance
of ﬁnding a job).14 In this case any marginal deviation from symmetry leads to re-immigration
into the marginally smaller region — the system returns to symmetry. On the other hand sym-
metry is instable, if a marginal increase of λ leads to a decrease (increase) of the unemployment
rate in region r (s). Any deviation from symmetry then results in a self-enforcing agglomeration
process. In order to ﬁnd the break point, the deviation ∂δr/∂λ for the system in the symmetric
equilibrium is calculated and the value of τ is searched to ﬁnd the point where the deviation is
zero. At this point the symmetric equilibrium changes from instable to stable.
A special feature of the symmetric equilibrium is that the endogenous variables share the same
values in both regions and the deviations of these values against λ have equal value but opposite
sign in both regions. Therefore the index for the regions is dropped. The value of τ in the break
point is then given by:
14Any marginal deviation from symmetry leads to deviations of the endogenous variables with equal value but


























































(λN − L)2(Ndλ − dLM) (59)
For small transport costs a marginal deviation from symmetry leads to a higher nominal
wage and a smaller price index in the larger region. Therefore the real wage (unemployment
rate) is higher (smaller) in the larger region and immigration into the larger region sets in.
A cumulative agglomeration process takes places, leading to a core-periphery structure — the
symmetric equilibrium is instable. For high transport costs export is hindered. A marginal
deviation from symmetry then does not allow the larger region to export its production. The
eﬀect of the larger manufacturing employment in the larger region on income in that region
cannot oﬀset the negative eﬀect of the decreased manufacturing employment on income and
import demand in the smaller region. The real wage of the larger region therefore is smaller and
re-immigration into the smaller region sets in. The system returns to the (stable) symmetric
equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates these eﬀects by looking at the change of the unemployment rate
(which directly follows from the change in δ) against transport costs. For low transport costs
the unemployment rate increases in region r once region r has a marginally larger manufacturing
labor force. Then symmetry is instable. For high transport costs the opposite is true and
symmetry is stable. The break point lies at the value of τ where both eﬀects oﬀset each other












symmetry instable symmetry stable
Figure 3: Break Point
5.3 Results and Parameter Variation
The long term equilibria for the above illustrated parameter constellation are summarized in
ﬁgure 4 (the so called bifurcation diagram) by plotting the division of manufacturing labor force
in the regions λ against transport costs τ. The continuous lines represent stable, and the dashed
lines instable equilibria. For small τ the symmetric equilibrium at λ = 0.5 is instable, whereas
the agglomeartion equilibria at λ = 1 and λ = 0 are stable. Increasing transport cost ﬁrst
lead to a stable symmetric equilibrium (the break point marks the border between stable and
instable). Further increasing transport cost then lead to instable agglomeration equilibria: The
agglomeration equilibria become instable and disappear (the sustain point marks the border
between stable agglomeration and no agglomeration). Break and sustain points are connected
through a dashed line representing the instable additional equilibria discussed earlier. These
represent those thresholds that decide upon whether agglomeration or symmetry results.
The larger the elasticity of substitution, the lower are the values of transport costs for the break
and sustain points: Increasing elasticity of substitution leads to increasing product diﬀerentiation
and decreasing mark-ups on prices resulting in a decrease of agglomeration advantages. Figures
5 and 6 represent graphical illustration of the corresponding bifurcation diagrams for θ = 3 and
θ = 6 (all other parameters remain the same).
In general, the value of transport costs at the sustain and break points are larger, when the
















Figure 4: Bifurcation-diagram at θ = 4
µ = 0.2 µ = 0.4 µ = 0.6
τ(B) τ(S) τ(B) τ(S) τ(B) τ(S)
θ = 3 1.669 1.718 3.055 4.471 8.718 3125
θ = 4 1.373 1.393 1.972 2.339 3.302 14.62
θ = 5 1.257 1.269 1.627 1.807 2.3 5
τ(B) and τ(S) represent the τ-values of the break (B) and sustain points (S).
Table 2: Break- and sustain points for several θ and µ
is illustrated in table 2 where the transport costs at the sustain and break points are plotted
against diﬀerent θ and µ. The underlying parameters are e = 0.5, γ = 0.1, ψ = 0.1, ρ = 0.05.
However, a variation of these labor market variables does not change the agglomeration pattern
and hence the sustain and break points. The reason is that the agglomeration behavior of the
regions stems from the goods market part of the model whereas the labor market part of the
model translates the agglomeration pattern into unemployment and wages.15

















Figure 5: Bifurcation-diagram at θ = 3
6 Interpretation and Discussion
The goods market of the model is based on Fujita et al. (1999) and hence the agglomeration pat-
tern is qualitatively comparable to their results: For small transport costs full agglomeration of
manufacturing in one region endogenously arises, even if both regions share the same character-
istics and endowments. Only when transport costs are large enough, symmetry becomes a stable
equilibrium (break point). When transport costs increase above the sustain point, agglomeration
becomes instable and regions will return to symmetry for all initial starting values. However,
in contrast to Fujita et al. (1999), unemployment exists in both regions as a result of eﬃciency
wages. The unemployment rate in the agglomeration is — as long as the agglomeration is stable
— lower or at least equal to the unemployment rate in the periphery. The model presented
here is thus able to explain, how agglomerations endogenously arise through the interplay of
transportation costs, increasing returns to scale and migration and how regional labor markets
(especially wages and unemployment) adjust to agglomeration. Regional labor market disparities
endogenously arise through the interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces.
The results are comparable to those of Epifani and Gancia (2005). These authors base their
regional labor market model on the model of Fujita et al. (1999) as well. Disparities in wages
and unemployment endogenously arise through agglomeration in a similar way. However, they
focus on labor market frictions in job matching processes and assume ﬂexible wages, whereas
















Figure 6: Bifurcation-diagram at θ = 6
here complement each other by discussing diﬀerent labor market frictions in the framework of
the New Economic Geography.
The results are further comparable to Südekum (2005). He discusses a wage curve based
on eﬃciency wages within the framework of a regional goods market model. In contrast to
the present paper, he exclusively focuses on centripetal forces to be able to solve the model
analytically. In his model agglomeration patterns lead to higher wages and lower unemployment
in the core compared to the periphery. Nevertheless, without any additional assumptions on
migration full agglomeration necessarily results due to the lack of centrifugal forces. The present
model instead discusses disparities of regional labor markets within the interplay of centrifugal
and centripetal forces and is therefore able to distinguish under which circumstances disparities
arise (or not).
7 Conclusions
Disparities of regional labor markets are a key characteristic of Germany (and other countries
as well). Their level is comparable to disparities between national states. Whereas on national
level institutional factors of the labor market are often held responsible for these disparities, they
can only account for a minor fraction of regional disparities since institutional factors vary only
marginally on the regional level (Blien and Sanner; 2006).
24The concept of the wage curve plays a key role, especially on the regional level: Empiri-
cal evidence indicates that there is a negative relationship between unemployment and wages
(Blanchﬂower and Oswald; 1994). Eﬃciency wages are particularly suitable to explain the wage
curve for German regions (Blien; 2001). However, in this case disparities between regional labor
markets can only result from disparities in labor demand. Overman and Puga (2002) deliver
empirical evidence in favor of labor demand being the main cause of regional labor market dis-
parities in Europe. As a result regional goods markets play a key role for explaining disparities of
regional labor markets. The New Economic Geography discusses how such disparities of regional
goods markets endogenously arise.
Consequently, the present paper discusses how disparities of regional labor markets endoge-
nously arise by introducing the wage curve (based on eﬃciency wages) into the New Economic
Geography. The model presented here shows how disparities of regional goods markets endoge-
nously arise through the interplay of increasing returns to scale, transport costs and migration
and how this leads to disparities of regional unemployment rates and wages. If a core-periphery
structure (endogenously) arises, unemployment is lower and wages are higher in the core com-
pared to the periphery. The results are comparable to Epifani and Gancia (2005) who focus
on frictions in job matching — opposed to frictions in wage setting, as presented here. Thus,
their approach and the model presented here complement each other by discussing diﬀerent la-
bor market frictions in the framework of the New Economic Geography. The results are further
comparable to Südekum (2005) who focuses on centripetal forces only, whereas the present paper
discusses the interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces.
Future research will show how the agglomeration pattern changes when congestion costs exist.
Ricci (1999) discusses congestion costs in a New Economic Geography setting. However, how
these congestion costs interact with regional labor markets and especially with migration decisions
in the presence of unemployment is subject to future research.
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